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Industrial policies have been a major source of economic and political debate 
in the United States and other nations in recent years. Advocates of industrial 
policies assert that, since all public policies inevitably influence the compo- 
sition of output and some industries are “better”  for a national economy than 
others, it  is  appropriate  for governments to  manage their  influence on the 
economy  to  promote  such goals as  growth  and competitiveness. Industrial 
policy advocates often cite Japan as an example of a nation that has benefited 
from sound industrial policies. Critics of  industrial policy have generally cited 
standard  economic  arguments  against  such  policies,  suggesting  that,  in 
competitive or nearly competitive markets, there are no gains to be had from 
altering the composition of output. 
In  tandem  with  political  debates  over  industrial  policy,  a  burgeoning 
academic literature on strategic trade policy, initiated by Brander and Spencer 
(1983,  1984)  and  surveyed  in  Krugman  (1986)  and  Dixit  (1987),  has 
examined policy  measures that can shift monopoly rents from one nation to 
another when product markets are imperfectly competitive. ’ A central focus 
in  this  literature has been  on imperfections  in  product  markets, especially 
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markets with  large learning  curve effects. While  this  literature has yielded 
intriguing counterexamples to some widely believed propositions,  we believe 
that its emphasis on product market imperfections as the potential rationale for 
industrial policies is somewhat misplaced.’ 
We  suspect that deviations from competitive labor markets that give rise to 
significant  interindustry wage differentials  are at least equally important for 
industrial  policy  as  product  market  imperfections  are.  Industrial  policy 
advocates such as Robert Reich and Lester Thurow, who encourage subsidies 
for “high  value added production,”  appear to be referring not to especially 
profitable  industries  but  to  industries  that  pay  high  wages.  Certainly, the 
international pervasiveness  of  subsidies to steel industries  is probably  more 
easily understood on the basis of the very high-wage jobs they provide than 
on the basis of  the profits earned by steel companies. 
The observation that rents accruing to labor are much more significant than 
monopoly  rents received  by  firms is a very general one. For  the American 
nonfinancial corporate sector in 1987, employee compensation represented 82 
percent of value added, while operating profits represented  only 18 percent, 
with  the bulk  of  the  latter  figure  being  the  return  to capital  rather  than 
monopoly rents.  It follows that the labor rents associated with industry wage 
differentials of even 10 percent bulk very large when compared with plausible 
estimates of firms’ monopoly rents.’  In fact, Katz and Summers (1989) find 
that variations in labor rents across industries are at least two to three times as 
important as variations in the rents accruing to shareholders. 
This paper explores both theoretically and empirically the implications of 
labor market imperfections for trade policies, focusing on the situation of the 
United  States in  the  1980s. We  begin  in section 3.1 by demonstrating that, 
contrary to competitive labor market theories, there are substantial differences 
between  industries  in  the  compensation  received  by  workers  with  similar 
characteristics  working  under  apparently  similar conditions. The industrial 
wagc structure is remarkably stable across time and space. While unions are 
a partial  source of these wage differentials, wage differentials  are large for 
nonunion  workers  and  in  settings  like  the  American  South, where  union 
threats  are  not  very  important. The differentials  appear to  arise from  the 
differential  importance  of  motivating, retaining, and recruiting  workers, as 
suggested by the efficiency wage theories surveyed in Katz (1986) and from 
the  rent-sharing  considerations  considered  in  more  detail  in  Katz  and 
Summers (1989). 
Section 3.2  considers theoretically the implications of noncompetitive wage 
differentials for trade and industrial policies.  We  find that interindustry wage 
differences provide  a rationale  for policies quite similar to those  that  have 
been advanced by industrial policy advocates. While it is difficult to justify 
subsidizing industries that achieve high value added per worker by relying on 
abnormally skilled workers or by using a great deal of  capital or other inputs, 
there is a rationale for subsidizing industries that have high value added per 87  Interindustry Wage  Differentials 
worker because of noncompetitive wage differentials. If firms hire labor to the 
point where its marginal product equals the wage, the marginal productivity 
of  an additional worker is greater in sectors paying  premium wages than in 
competitive wage sectors. In this case, policy measures that expand employ- 
ment in high-wage sectors may be desirable. Of course, the basic thrust of this 
theoretical  argument is not new. The role of factor market distortions in the 
design of  optimal trade policies has played a prominent role in trade theory at 
least since the work of Hagen (1 958) and Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963). 
Furthermore, both stylized calculations and consideration of  actual examples 
suggest that these effects may well be quantitatively  important. 
Section 3.3 combines data on industry wage premiums with data on trade 
flows to assess the importance of  wage differentials  for trade policies.  We 
reach  three primary  conclusions. First, wage differentials  cause the United 
States to reap extra gains from trade, at least within the manufacturing sector. 
Manufacturing  exports in  the  United  States come disproportionately  from 
industries that pay  premium  wages, while manufacturing  imports generally 
come from  low-wage  sectors.  Second,  exporting  high-wage  goods  while 
importing lower-wage goods is a characteristic common to other developed 
countries. Third, despite concerns about undesirable changes in the structure 
of  the U.S. economy, it does not appear (at least through  1984) that changing 
trade patterns have disproportionately  hurt the high-wage portion of  the U.S. 
manufacturing  sector.  Instead,  increased  import  competition  has  had  its 
greatest effect on employment in low-wage parts of  the U.S. manufacturing 
sector. 
Section 3.4 concludes the paper by offering a tentative assessment of  the 
implications of our results for actual trade, industrial,  and tax policies.  Our 
general view  is that policies directed at reducing  imports are likely to have 
extremely  adverse  effects on  economic welfare, whereas  certain measures 
aimed at expanding employment in export sectors may increase welfare. Any 
economic  case for activist  policy  must  be  tempered  by  a recognition  that 
theoretically  optimal  policies  are extremely  unlikely  to be  implemented  in 
practice. 
3.1  The Importance of Interindustry Wage Differentials 
Several recent studies have documented  large and persistent wage differ- 
entials among industries, even after controlling for a wide variety of worker 
and  job  characteristics  (Dickens  and  Katz  1987a,  1987b;  Krueger  and 
Summers 1987,  1988; and Murphy  and Topel  1987).4  The pattern of these 
differentials is remarkably  parallel  in looking at data for different countries 
and time periods and suggests that workers in some sectors earn substantial 
rents.  This section  summarizes the  available evidence on the  interindustry 
wage structure and discusses the consistency with the evidence of  alternative 
models of  wage  determination. We  conclude that  competitive  labor market 88  Lawrence F.  Katz/Lawrence H. Summers 
explanations stressing urimeasured labor quality and compensating differen- 
tials do not provide  a plausible explanation  for a substantial component of 
interindustry  wage variations, even for nonunion workers.  Instead,  industry 
wage differentials largely reflect firms'  differing needs to use high wages to 
motivate, retain,  and recruit their workers and rent-sharing considerations. 
3.1.1 
We  analyze  industry  wage  differences  in  the  United  Stidtes using  cross- 
sectional  data  on  individuals  from  the  1984  Current  Population  Surveys 
(CPS). All  twelve  CPS surveys  from  1984 were  combined  to  generate  a 
sample large enough  to  estimate  accurately  wage  differentials  for detailed 
industry  ~ategories.~  Our  sample  consists  of  nonagricultural  employees 
sixteen years old or older and excludes workers employed in public admin- 
istration.  The earnings  variable  is usual  weekly  earnings divided  by  usual 
weekly  hours.6  The  procedures  utilized  are  described  in  Krueger  and 
Summers (1988). In particular, we normalize the estimated wage differentials 
as deviations from the (employment-weighted) mean differential. 
The first column in table 3.1 reports the proportionate difference in wages 
between the average worker in a two-digit census industry  and the weighted 
average worker in all industries. The second column reports the normalized 
industry  wage  differences  after controlling  for education, age, occupation, 
gender,  race,  marital  status,  standard metropolitan  statistical area,  full-time 
work, and student status and allowing many of  the coefficients  to differ for 
males and females. Controlling for available worker characteristics has little 
effect on the rankings of  different industries; the correlation of the  industry 
wage differentials estimated with and without controls is 0.96. This finding 
suggests that comparisons of  average  industry  wages over time and  across 
countries may be useful since it is unlikely that controls would change one's 
inferences about the relative rankings of  industries in the wage structure. 
The Magnitude of  Interindustry Wage Differences 
Table 3.1  Estimated Industry Log Wage Differentials-Full  Year  1984 CPS 
Industry 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
All-Total 
All  All  Compensation  Nonunion 
without  with  with  with 
Controls  Controls"  Controls"  Controls" 
Mining 
Construction 
Lumber  - 
Furniture  ~ 
Stone, clay, & glass 
Primary metals 
Fabricated metals 
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Table 3.1  (continued) 
Industry 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
All-Total 
All  All  Compensation  Nonunion 
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,069 
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,004 
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-.161 
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-  ,014 
,077 
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Note:  "Standard errors are not reported to save space. In all cases, the standard errors are between 
,004  and ,020, except for tobacco, which has standard errors ranging from ,039 to  ,049. 
aControls include education and its square; six age dummies; eight occupation dummies; female 
dummy; race  dummy; standard  metropolitan  statistical  area  dummy; three  region  dummies; 
full-time work dummy; full- and part-time student dummies; interactions of the female dummy 
with marriage, education, education  squared, and the six age dummies; and a constant.  Each 
column was estimated from a separate cross-sectional regression. 
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The controls do substantially reduce the estimated interindustry dispersion 
of  wages. The standard  deviation  of  the  estimated  wage  differentials  falls 
from  27  percent  without  controls  to  14 percent  when  controls  are  added. 
Almost all this decline is attributable to holding occupation and sex constant. 
Industry  affiliation  has  a  large effect on  relative  wages  even  allowing  for 
observed  differences  in  occupation,  human  capital  variables,  and  demo- 
graphic background.  Industry  differentials range from  a high of  29 percent 
above  the  mean  in  petroleum  to  34  percent  below  the  mean  in  private 
household  services.  Durable  goods manufacturing,  mining,  and  chemicals 
industries pay wages well above those for workers in retail trade and service 
industries, all else constant.  Substantial wage differentials are also apparent 
within the traded-goods (manufacturing) sector. 
One possibility is that these differentials largely serve to offset differences 
in nonwage compensation. One nonwage aspect of compensation that we can 
control  for using our data is fringe benefits.  Fringe benefits  account for as 
much  as  50  percent  of  compensation  in  some  industries.  To  adjust  for 
variation in fringes across industries, we multiplied our CPS hourly wage data 
for each worker in the sample by the ratio of total labor costs to wages in the 
corresponding  industry  in  1984.7 The  third  column  of  table  3.1  presents 
estimates of industry wage differentials with the dependent variable adjusted 
to reflect both  wage  and  nonwage  compensation.  The estimated  standard 
deviation of industry differentials actually increases by  more than one-fourth, 
from  14.4  to  18.5 percent.  Thus,  the  consideration  of  fringe  benefits 
reinforces, rather than reduces,  industry compensation differences. 
Discussions of  industry wage differences frequently emphasize the impor- 
tance of unions in wage setting. The inclusion of union membership and union 
coverage dummy variables in the specification reported in the second columr, 
of table 3.  I,  however, has little effect on the estimated industry differentials. 
The standard  deviation  of  the differentials falls from  14.4 to  13.9 percent. 
Since unions are likely to have different effects on  wages in industries with 
different product market structures and costs of strikes, a better approach is to 
assess the importance of industry  differentials for a sample containing only 
nonunion workers.9 Column 4 of table 3.1 presents these. The industry wage 
premia  are  quite  substantial  for  nonunion  workers.  We  also  estimated 
differentials  for  the  union  workers  in  our  sample  and  found  the  standard 
deviation of the differentials to be slightly larger for nonunion workers (14.1 
as opposed to 13.3 percent). The correlation of the differentials for the union 
and  nonunion  samples is 0.80. There appears to be  little difference  in the 
process generating industry relative wages in the union and nonunion sectors. 
Further evidence that unions are not the primary factor accounting for wage 
differentials comes from Krueger and Summers’s (1  988) finding that the wage 
structure in the southern part of the United States looks very similar to that in 
the rest of the country, despite much lower rates of unionization. 91  Interindustry Wage Differentials 
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3.1.2  Regularities in the Interindustry Wage Structure 
Industry wage differences appear to  be quite stable across rime and space. 
Krueger  and  Summers  (1987)  examine  evidence  on  the  industry  wage 
structure in the United States from 1900  to 1984. They find that the correlation 
between relative  wages  in nine  major industries  is 0.62 between  1900 and 
1984  and  0.91  between  1970 and  1984.  Krueger  and  Summers  further 
document  that  the  relative  rankings  of  industry  average  wages in detailed 
manufacturing industries are also extremely stable over time. Figure 3.1 plots 
industry  wage differentials  for nineteen  two-digit  manufacturing  industries 
estimated from the May  1974 CPS against analogous differentials estimated 
from the May  1984 CPS."  Despite widespread concern about the effect of 
trade  on  affected  industries, the  figure  illustrates  that  the  industry  wage 
structure in manufacturing has been very stable over the last decade. Freeman 
and Katz (1987) study the effects of  import competition  on wages in U.S. 
manufacturing and find that a 10 percent decrease in industry revenues from 
increased import penetration reduces an industry's  relative wage for produc- 
tion workers by  only 0.5 percent." 
Industry wage patterns are remarkably similar among countries with diverse 
labor  market  institutions.  Table  3.2 presents  evidence on  the  remarkable 
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Table 3.2  Correlations of Log Manufacturing Wages among Countries in 1983 
Country 
United  United 
Australia  Chile  France  Germany  Japan  Korea  Sweden  Kingdom  States 










1  .OO  .66  .80  .81  .84  .67  .77  .78  .92 
1.00  .60  .60  .69  .46  .67  .56  .67 
1.00  .89  .80  .53  .64  .77  .8S 
1.00  .94  .62  .75  .93  .95 
1.00  .59  .80  .9S  .92 
1.00  .68  .S9  .66 
1 .oo  .79  .79 
1.00  .86 
1 .oo 
Note:  In the column headings, “yr.”  denotes yearly wages, and “hr.”  denotes hourly wages. Wages are 
for operatives, except for France, where the wage is the  average wage of all workers. The data cover 
nineteen  manufacturing  industries.  Data  are  available  for  only  eighteen  industries  for  Korea  and 
Australia, seventeen industries for Germany, and fifteen industries for France. Each pairwise correlation 
uses the maximum number of industries possible. 
Source: Industrial  Statistics  Yearbook,  IY84,  vol.  1  (New  York:  United  Nations,  Department  of 
International Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office,  1986). 
The use of  a single occupational  group (operatives) allows us to control for 
skill  mix  differences  across  countries.  The  cross-country  correlations  of 
relative wages are quite high, typically between 0.6 and 0.9. For example, the 
correlation between the relative wages of operatives in the United States and 
Japan is 0.95. We illustrate this similarity in the wage structures of the United 
States and Japan in figure 3.2. Krueger and Summers (1987) also find strong 
positive correlations in relative average industry wages among a larger group 
of  countries.  The stability in differentials  across time periods and countries 
strongly suggests that these wage differences result from factors fundamental 
to the operation of industrial economies and are not the artifact of particular 
collective  bargaining  systems  or  government  interventions  in  the  labor 
market. 
The industry wage  structure also appears to  be very  similar for different 
types  of  workers. Dickens  and  Katz  (1987b)  find  that  interindustry  wage 
differentials are highly correlated across occupations: in industries where one 
occupation is highly paid, all occupations tend to be highly paid. For example, 
they  find  that  the  correlation  in  industry  average  wages  for  managers  and 
laborers  is 0.83, even after controlling  for worker  characteristics.  Further- 
more, Krueger and Summers (1988) show that the pattern of  differentials is 
quite similar for young and old workers and for workers with short and long 
job tenure. 93  Interindustry Wage Differentials 
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3.1.3  The Characteristics of High- and Low-Wage Industries 
The evidence  summarized  above  indicates  that  there  exists a  pattern  of 
wage differentials in which all workers in some industries are paid more than 
similar workers in other industries.  This raises the question of what are the 
attributes of high- and low-wage industries. Dickens and Katz (1987a) review 
the  literature  on  the  relations  among industry  characteristics  and  industry 
wages. They find  that, even after controlling  for observed human  capital, 
geographic.  and demographic variables,  both union and nonunion wages are 
positively correlated with capital intecsity, measures of product market power 
and  ability  to  pay,  union  density,  average  education  level,  and  firm  and 
establishment size. High-wage industries also have much lower quit rates than 
low-wage industries. 
The characteristics of  high-wage  and  low-wage  industries  in U.S.  manu- 
facturing  are  illustrated  in  figure  3.3. The tendency  of  capital  intensive 
industries (and those with a low labor share) to pay high wages is apparent. 
The relation between research  and development spending and wages is less 
clear  cut.  Unfortunately,  as  Dickens  and  Katz  note,  it  is  not  possible  to 
disentangle the independent effects of these factors on wages reliably. 
3.1.4  Do Industry Wage Differentials  Reflect Labor Rents? 
The competitive  labor market model offers two types of explanations for 
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for nonpecuniary differences in job attributes, or they may reflect differences 
in unmeasured  labor quality.  If  compensating differentials  and unobserved 
ability adequately explain the bulk of measured industry wage differences, then 
the presence of large industry wage differentials  should not be an important 
consideration in the evaluation of  trade policies. 
Interindustry  wage  differences do not  appear to be  easily  explained  by 
compensating differentials,  for several reasons. First, Krueger and Summers 
(1988) find that the inclusion of controls for observable differences in working 
conditions tends to increase rather  than decrease estimates of  the extent of 
interindustry wage variation. Furthermore, the estimates in table 3.1 indicate 
that the consideration of fringe benefits leads to substantially larger estimates 
of  industry compensation  differences.  Thus, the  consideration  of  observed 
nonwage compensation exacerbates the industry differentials. 
Second, the  strong  correlation  in  interindustry  wage differences across 
occupations is also difficult to explain through equalizing differences since it 
is unlikely that whenever working conditions are poor for production workers 
they are also poor for managers, secretaries, and salesmen. Third, Pencavel 
(1970) and many others have shown that there is a strong negative correlation 
between  industry  wage  differentials  and  quit  rates.  Furthermore,  Holzer, 
Katz,  and  Krueger  (1988) find  that  high-wage industries  attract  a  greater 
number  of job applicants  per  opening than do low-wage industries.  These 
findings strongly suggest that workers in high-wage industries earn rents. 
An  alternative  competitive  explanation  of  these  wage  differences  is that 
they  largely reflect  differences  in workers’  productive  abilities that  are not 
captured by the variables  available in individual  level data sets. While it is 
almost certain  that  unobserved  quality differences account for much of  the 
variation  in  the  wages  that  workers  with  similar observed characteristics 
receive, this does not necessarily imply that differences in the average wage 
paid in different industries are the result of  differences in the average level of 
unobserved  ability.  Four types of evidence suggest  that it is unlikely  that  a 
large part of measured interindustry wage differences can be accounted for by 
unmeasured ability. 
First, Krueger and Summers (1988) find that, after controlling for sex and 
occupation,  controlling  for  other  skill  variables  such  as  education  and 
experience has only a very small effect on the dispersion of industry wages. 
This is because there are only minor differences in educational attainment and 
in experience across industries after controlling for differences in occupational 
composition.  Given the absence of a high degree of  industrial sorting on the 
basis  of  observed  labor  quality  proxies,  a  high  degree  of  sorting  on 
unobserved characteristics would be surprising. 
Second, Krueger and Summers (1988) present longitudinal evidence that 
when individual workers move between industries, either because of displace- 
ment  or because of normal  labor market processes, their wages change by 
amounts  similar  to  the  industry  differentials  estimated  in  cross-sectional 96  Lawrence F.  Katz/Lawrence H. Summers 
regressions. l2  This finding casts some doubt on the hypothesis that measured 
interindustry wage differences are largely attributable to unobserved produc- 
tive ability. 
Third, much evidence indicates that more profitable industries-those  with 
more monopoly power and those where labor’s share is smaller-pay  higher 
wages.  These regularities  hold  in different  times  and  places  and explain a 
sizable fraction of  interindustry wage variation. There is no obvious reason 
why these product  market characteristics  should be strongly correlated  with 
unmeasured ability. 
Fourth,  the  strong  similarity  in  wage differences  for different  types  of 
workers  is  also problematic  for  the  unmeasured  ability  view.  Why should 
industry technologies almost always have such strong skill complementarities 
that  those  requiring  unusually  good  operatives  require  unusually  good 
managers and clerical workers? Furthermore, industry differences in observed 
quality measures for different occupational groups do not appear to be nearly 
as strongly  correlated  as do their  industry  wage differentials.  Dickens  and 
Katz  (1988) find  that  industry  average  education  levels  are  only  weakly 
positively  correlated for many occupations  and are negatively correlated for 
some groups. 
Our reading of the evidence is that it is difficult to account convincingly for 
the industry wage structure on the basis of unobserved  ability differences or 
equalizing differences. Instead, it appears that workers  in high-wage  indus- 
tries earn rents. 
3.1.5 
The  natural  economic  approach  to  explaining  why  firms  in  high-wage 
industries fail to cut wages in the absence of any legal compulsion is to isolate 
reasons  why  reducing  wages would  be  unprofitable for a firm.  This is the 
approach  taken  in  the  large  and growing efficiency  wage  literature.  This 
literature, surveyed from a theoretical perspective in Stiglitz (1987) and from 
an empirical perspective in Katz (1986), has put forth a number of possible 
explanations for firms’ failure to cut wages in the face of an excess supply of 
labor and their willingness to confer rents on incumbent workers. 
A  first  explanation,  emphasized  by  Shapiro and  Stiglitz  (1984) in  the 
context of unemployment  and Bulow and Summers (1986) in the context of 
wage  differentials,  emphasizes the  firms’  need to deter their  workers  from 
shirking. Conferring rents on them, which will be forfeited if they are caught 
shirking, may be an efficient alternative to more extensive monitoring costs. 
This theory  may rationalize  the observation  that capital  intensive firms and 
those  offering  more job  autonomy  pay  higher  wages  because  the  cost of 
shirking is higher  in these firms.  Krueger (1987) provides  some supporting 
evidence by  documenting that fast food firms appear to trade off wages and 
monitoring effort. 
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A  second  explanation  revolves  around  firms’  desire  to  avoid  turnover 
because  of  fixed  hiring  and  training  costs.  This  explanation,  elegantly 
modeled  by  Stiglitz  (1985), is  consistent  with  the  observation  that  wage 
premia appear to be somewhat larger for experienced than for inexperienced 
workers.  It  is also supported by  frequent references  to the need to monitor 
turnover in personnel books. A third related explanation for firms’ willingness 
to  confer rents  involves  adverse  selection  considerations  (Weiss  1980). If 
more  able  workers  have  higher  reservation  wages  than  their  less  able 
counterparts, firms that reduce wages may find that the average ability of their 
work force declines so rapidly that unit labor costs increase. This explanation 
is consistent with the complaints of some managers that the “wrong”  workers 
quit in good times. 
While each of  these explanations  can be formalized, they  appear insuffi- 
cient to account fully for the observed pattern of wage differentials. A striking 
feature of  this pattern is the similarity in industry wage patterns for different 
occupational  groups. It is difficult  to see why industries  with an especially 
great need  to motivate and retain operatives  should  also have an especially 
great  need  to motivate  and retain  clerical  workers.  The similarity  of  wage 
patterns in different occupaticns, along with the observation  that monopoly 
power appears to influence wages, suggests that firms for which production 
interferences are especially  costly may  pay  abnormally  high wages even in 
nonunion settings. 
This type of behavior can be justified on  the grounds of  “gift  exchange” 
theories of the type advanced by Akerlof (1984). In these models, a worker’s 
effort depends on his or her perception of how fairly he or she is being treated. 
Perceived  fairness in turn  depends on how profitable the firm is.  A related 
argument might hold that firms pay high wages to “buy the peace,”  avoiding 
unions or collective visible shirking of the kind that Mathewson (1969) and 
Mars (1982) find  in  many  industrial  settings.  The “peace”  may  be  worth 
more  to  some  firms  than  to others.  A  final  explanation invokes  expense 
preference behavior on the part of managers, who may feel more loyalty to 
employees than  to shareholders, particularly  at low levels.  If  the efficiency 
effects of  wage increases described  in previous paragraphs  are important, it 
may not be  very costly for firms to raise wages. 
3.1.6  Conclusions 
The evidence in this section suggests that  industry wage differentials  for 
similar workers are substantial. It appears that these wage differentials largely 
reflect rents earned by  workers in high-wage  industries.  No doubt, industry 
wage differences result from a number of sources. Fortunately, as we argue in 
the next  section, the  implications  of  noncompetitive  wage  differentials  for 
trade policies are similar for a variety of underlying causes of  the differentials 
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3.2  Wage Differentials and Trade Policies 
The basic argument linking labor market imperfections and trade policies 
has  long  been  recognized  by  trade  theorists  (see,  e.g.,  Bhagwati  and 
Srinivasan 1983; and Magee 1976). It has been echoed, though in a less clear 
fashion, in the American debate over industrial policies. If competitive forces 
do not equalize wages in different sectors, and if  firms operate on their labor 
demand curves, then the marginal product of labor in different sectors will not 
be equated, resulting  in allocative inefficiencies. Policies that raise employ- 
ment in high-wage sectors at the expense of employment in low-wage sectors 
will therefore increase allocative efficiency. This line of argument captures the 
thrust of  industrial policy arguments suggesting that countries can raise their 
workers’ standards of living by encouraging the growth of “high  value added 
industries .’ ’ 
We  begin by demonstrating that the interaction of trade policies with wage 
differentials has welfare consequences that are likely to be more important than 
the profit-shifting  effects  that have been  the  focus  of  recent  discussions of 
strategic  trade  policy.  Then  we  examine  arguments  against  subsidies  to 
employment  in high-wage  sectors based on rent-seeking  and equity consid- 
erations. We conclude that on economic grounds there is a reasonably strong 
welfare argument for measures that promote production in high-wage indus- 
tries,  though  any  policy judgment must  depend  on an  assessment  of  how 
skillfully the government would manage its interventions. 
3.2.  I 
For simplicity, consider a stylized economy with two sectors. l3 Following 
the  terminology  of  Doeringer  and  Piore  (1971),  we  label  these  sectors 
“secondary”  and “primary.”  As we discuss below, the primary sector pays 
higher wages and offers workers more responsible jobs than the  secondary 
sector.  Secondary-sector  output,  taken  as  the  numeraire,  is  given  by 
Y“  = w,L“.  The secondary-sector  labor market is competitive,  so workers 
employed  in the  secondary  sector  receive  a  wage  equal  to  their  marginal 
product, w,,.  Primary-sector  output is given by the constant returns to scale 
production function Yp = F(Kp,Lp).  The demand for primary-sector output is 
a decreasing function of its price, p  = p(Yp),  p’ < 0. We  assume that the 
wage  differential,  d, in the primary  sector  is a nondecreasing  function of 
employment, d = d(Lp),  d’ 2  0.  l4 It may depend positively on the level of 
employment because workers’  ability to extract rents is increased when the 
demand for labor increases or because the cost of leaving a high-wage job is 
reduced when there are more high-wage jobs in the economy. 
Assume  initially  that the economy is closed and that the capital  stock is 
fixed.  Firms  in  the  primary-  and  secondary-sector  product  markets  are 
assumed to act competitively. Then the first-order condition, 




determines  the level of  primary-sector  employment. This level  of  primary- 
sector employment is inefficiently low. As figure 3.4 illustrates, a subsidy to 
employment in the primary sector at a rate just sufficient to offset the wage 
differential  (l/[l + d])  would  permit  the  economy to  attain  the  first-best 
allocation  of  labor. l5  Note  that  such  a  subsidy  increases  efficiency,  even 
though it may lead to a widening of interindustry wage differentials. We return 
below to the question of whether it represents a Pareto improvement. 
So far we have maintained the assumption of perfect competition in product 
markets and the assumption that the capital  stock in each industry is fixed. 
Relaxing these assumptions tends to strengthen the case for policies directed 
at expanding the primary  sector. If firms in the primary sector have market 
power, this is another reason apart from wage premia why the social marginal 
product of labor in the primary sector exceeds the social marginal product of 
labor  in  the  secondary  sector.  Put  more  straightforwardly,  there  is  an 
efficiency case for subsidizing the variable inputs of a monopolist. 
Allowing  for  variable  capital  input  strengthens  the  case  for subsidies to 
high-wage  industries.  If  wage  differentials  do not  depend  on the  capital 
intensity of the primary sector, then the appropriate policy instrument in the 
presence  of  noncompetitive  wage  differentials  is a  wage  subsidy.  If  wage 
differentials are  an  increasing  function  of  capital  intensity,  as  some  rent- 
sharing theories  would  suggest, then  there is  a case for capital  investment 
subsidies to offset the  “tax”  levied by labor on capital investments. 
How  substantial  are the  potential  gains from  public  policies  directed  at 
offsetting  the  effects  of  interindustry  wage  differentials?  One  way  of 
answering this question is by comparing the efficiency costs of  interindustry 
wage  differentials  with other distortions  that have  received  more attention 
P(YP)FL(KP,  LP)  = w,(l  + 4, 
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from economists. Section 3.1 showed that the standard deviation of nonunion 
industry  compensation  differences,  after  correcting  for  measured  ability 
differences.  was  about  18  percent.  About  15  percent  of  private-sector 
American workers are covered by trade union agreements, and it is generally 
estimated  that  their  compensation  is  about  20 percent  above that  of  other 
workers.  If  this  were  the  only  source of  wage  inequality,  the  standard 
deviation of wages would be approximately 7 percent.  This suggests that the 
allocative  inefficiency  attributable  to  industry  wage  effects  is  at  least 
comparable to the efficiency costs arising from union wage differentials. 
A  different  standard  of  comparison is  the  distortionary consequence of 
taxation. Assuming that labor's share in output is about three-quarters-a  20 
percent difference in labor costs between two sectors-will  affect the product 
mix in the same way as a 60 percent capital income tax or a 15 percent sales 
tax.  The former figure is more than  what is at stake in the much-discussed 
distortion  between  corporate capital  and  owner-occupied  housing.  Much 
smaller differentials in effective tax rates played a prominent role in the recent 
U.S. tax reform debate. Discussions of  sales taxes invariably treat differences 
of only a few percentage points in the rates on included and excluded items 
as a serious problem. 
Interindustry wage differences appear to cause allocative distortions greater 
than those resulting from trade unions or the corporate income tax. A different 
way of  demonstrating  their  importance is by evaluating the marginal  social 
product of capital in the primary sector in their presence. The value of output 
measured at preintervention  prices in our stylized economy is given by 
(2)  Y  = pF(KP,  Lp)  + woLn, 
where  L"  + Lp = L  and L  is  the  fixed  stock  of  labor  in  the  economy. 
Differentiating (2) with respect to Kp,  the primary-sector capital stock, and 
then  using  both  the  first-order  condition (1) and  the  assumption  that  the 
primary-sector  production  function  displays constant returns  to  scale,  we 
obtain the result 
(3)  dY/dKP = r{l  + [ad/(l -  + d)]} 
where Y represents the total value of national income, r is the return received 
by the suppliers of capital, and (Y represents labor's share in the primary sector. 
Taking labor's share to be three-quarters and the wage differential to be 20 
percent,  this  implies that  the marginal  product  of  additional  capital  in  the 
primary sector is inflated by half because of the preexisting wage differential. 
This suggests that substantial gains may be achievable by targeting investment 
incentives toward high-wage sectors. 
3.2.2  Wage Differentials  in a Small Open Economy 
In the case of  a small open economy, illustrated in figure 3.5, the relative 
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Fig. 3.5  Subsidies in closed and open economies 
assumed  to  be  unaffected  by  the  domestic production  mix.  The demand 
function p(Yp)  becomes perfectly elastic. This does not change the first-order 
condition  (1) or the  desirability  of  employment subsidies for the  primary 
sector. Opening up the economy does, however, strengthen the case for large 
subsidies.  In  a closed  economy,  subsidies  to  the primary  sector  encounter 
diminishing returns as its output declines in value with increased production. 
This does not happen when the price of  output is set on world markets and is 
insensitive to the level of domestic production. l6 
There is a further point to be made. As figure 3.5 illustrates, the marginal 
welfare gained per dollar of  subsidy will be greater the greater is the world 
price  of primary-sector  output. As the world price of primary-sector  output 
expands, and as domestic production therefore expands, the wage differential 
increases, raising the social gain to inducing further expansion of the primary 
sector.  This observation  resonates  somewhat with  discussions  of  industrial 
policy  that claim that governments should support “sunrise’ ’ export indus- 
tries rather than “sunset”  import-competing industries. 
We have focused on the desirability of employment or production subsidies 
for the high-wage  sector. An  obvious alternative  is protection,  through  the 
exclusion of foreign competition. As illustrated in figure 3.6, protection has 
the virtue of  expanding the primary sector but the disadvantage of raising the 
consumer price of  the primary-sector good. It is clear from the figure that the 
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Fig. 3.6  The gains and losses from protection 
at least small movements toward protection will be welfare enhancing, though 
they will be less desirable than primary-sector employment subsidies. This is 
an illustration of  the general principle discussed by Bhagwati and Srinivasan 
(l983), that,  in  the  presence  of  distortions,  policies  can  be  ranked,  with 
instruments that most directly address distortions being preferred. 
Discussions of activist trade policies typically stress the potential defect that 
they invite retaliation,  which offsets any initial benefits. This argument does 
not apply when policy  options are limited to subsidies directed at capturing 
labor  market  rents. In  the  model  considered  here,  it  is true that  countries 
would prefer that their subsidies to primary-sector output not meet retaliation. 
In  our  model,  however,  subsidies  that  are  retaliated  against  by  similar 
subsidies are nonetheless likely to raise the welfare of both countries.”  This 
is because they will drive the world economy to a situation such as subsidized 
first-best optimum, depicted in figure 3.4. Note further that subsidies beyond 
the point where the marginal product of labor in the primary sector and the 
marginal product of  labor in the secondary sector are equated are inefficient 
in both open and closed economies. 
3.2.3  Gauging the Importance of  Labor Rents 
Under most plausible estimates, the wage differential effects stressed here 
are of  greater importance for trade policy than the product market monopoly 
rent-shifting effects discussed  in recent work on strategic  trade policy. The 
social return to increased investment in the presence of wage differentials can 
easily be as much as 50 percent greater than the private gain. The point may 
be  illustrated  more  strongly  by  considering  two recent  studies of  strategic 
trade policies-Baldwin  and Krugman’s (1987a, 1987b) study of  European 
subsidies to Airbus Industrie for the development of  the A300 jet and Dixit’s 
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Baldwin and Krugman construct a simple simulation model incorporating 
both learning curve effects and strategic interactions in aircraft industry. Their 
data indicate that the subsidy had very substantial effects on  the allocation of 
airplane production  between  the United  States and  Europe.  It also reduced 
prices in the industry considerably. The Baldwin-Krugman  analysis suggests 
that the subsidy program cost $1.47 billion in profits for the European airline 
industry and increased the consumer surplus of European customers by $I  .43 
billion,  leading  to  only  a  negligible  change  in  economic  welfare.  Their 
analysis  takes  no  account  of  the  rents  gained by  labor  as  it  moved  from 
lower-wage  industries  into  the  high-wage  airplane  industry,  however.  A 
policy analysis should not treat the rent component of the wage bill as a social 
cost of  production but as a component of the social surplus generated by the 
industry. 
To estimate the “labor rent”  effects of the Airbus program, we assumed 
alternatively that compensation in the entire product chain of airplanes was 25 
percent higher than the economy average and that it was 25 percent higher in 
only the final stage of production-airline  assembly. Combining these figures 
with Baldwin and Krugman’s  estimates of the diversion of sales toward the 
Airbus consortium and information  on labor’s share in airplane  production 
permits a rough estimate of the labor rent-shifting  effect of the Airbus subsidy 
of  the A300. 
The results  in table 3.3 indicate  that, once labor rent considerations  are 
recognized.  the  overall  assessment  of  the  Airbus  program  for  European 
welfare turns from marginally negative to strongly positive. Even in the less 
favorable case, the subsidy generates a welfare gain representing about half its 
cost. The estimated gain would be  far greater, recognizing  the high level of 
unemployment in Europe, if we assumed that some of those hired by Airbus 
would otherwise have been unemployed. 
A similar conclusion is suggested by Dixit’s recent study of the automobile 
industry.  He finds that allowing for labor rents in the American  automobile 
industry  dramatically  alters  the  results  of  his  analysis  based  on imperfect 
competition  in  the product  market.  Policies promoting  domestic  production 
that appear undesirable without taking account of labor market imperfections 
yield large gains once the existence of these imperfections is acknowledged. 
More careful empirical analysis of more specific incidents is needed before 
firm judgments about the potential importance of  labor rent shifting can be 
made.  The  examples  here  were  selected  by  other  authors  because  of 
potentially important product market imperfections.  It would  be valuable to 
examine  industries,  such  as  steel,  that  are  noted  for  large  labor  market 
imperfections. 
3.2.4  Some Possible Objections 
Our analysis so far has assumed away rent-seeking  behavior.  At  least two 
types of  rent  seeking  need  to be considered. First, it is possible that  wage 
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Table 3.3  Labor Market Rents and the Effects of the Airbus A300 Program 
on European Welfare 
Scenario 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
20% Labor Rents  20% Ldbor Rents 
No  Labor  at Final Stage  at All Stages 
Rents  of  Production"  of  Production' 
Change in  present discounted 
value of 
Consumer surplus  I .43  1.43 
Profits  -  1.47  -  1.47 
Labor rents  .oo  .90 





Nore:  All figures are in billions ofdollars. The computations assume a 5 percent discount rate and 
cumulative production  of  398 units over a twenty-year product cycle. 
Sources:  Adapted  from  table  5  of  Baldwin  and  Krugman  (l987b). The  changes  in  present 
discounted value  of  labor rents  are  based  on  the  authors'  own  calculations.  Information  on 
employee compensation, value of shipments, and value added for the U.S. aircraft industry (SIC 
3721) are  from  the  1985 Annual  Survey  of  Manufactures  (Bureau  of  Census,  Sfatistics ,fiw 
/tidu.stry Groups and lndusrries [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office]). 
"The change in labor rents is computed as the change in the present discounted value of shipments 
for Airbus calculated  from the Baldwin-Krugman simulation ($15.41 billion) times the ratio of 
employee compensation to value of shipments in the U.S. aircraft industry  in  1985 (0.291) times 
the share of  rents in  employee compensation (0.20). 
hThe change in labor rents is computed in a manner analogous to that described in n. a above with 
the share of employee compensation in value added in the U.S. aircraft industry in  1985 (0.596) 
replacing the share of employee compensation in  value of  shipments 
Todaro (1970). In the extreme case where the primary sector hires randomly 
each period from a pool of  waiting applicants,  wp(l -  u) = wo, where u is 
the unemployment rate in the primary sector. In this case, there is no gain to 
increasing  primary-sector  employment  since,  for each  job  created  in  the 
primary  sector,  ul(1 -  u) workers  move  from  the  low-wage  sector  into 
unemployment  (Harberger  1971).  l9 A  more  plausible  formulation  of  wait 
unemployment would recognize that incumbent employees typically retain the 
rights to their jobs each period so that only new openings and those jobs where 
the incumbent worker has quit or been terminated are available to be allocated 
to the unemployed.  Under this  scenario, if  workers have positive  discount 
rates and enter the primary-sector queue to the point where the utility of being 
in the queue equals the utility of being employed in the low-wage sector, extra 
employment in the primary sector will generate less induced unemployment 
than in the initial case considered. Thus, a small subsidy to the primary sector 
will  still  be  desirable.20  Furthermore,  if  workers  are  able  to  queue  for 
high-wage jobs from low-wage  jobs, rent seeking through wait unemployment 
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The second type of rent-seeking behavior involves efforts to create wage 
differentials.  Union organizing drives are an obvious example. If larger wage 
differentials  lead to larger employment subsidies, such rent-seeking  activity 
will  be  encouraged. In  this case, subsidies  to high-wage  industries,  while 
increasing efficiency ex post, may create large ex ante inefficiencies if they 
lead to more resources being devoted to trying to push up wages.  We  doubt 
that this point is of vast practical importance. Union organizing budgets and 
employer resistance expenditures are trivial compared to the rents earned by 
union workers. Taking 20 percent of the work force to be unionized and a 20 
percent union compensation effect implies that 4 percent of  wages, or about 
$75 billion  a year,  represents rents.  Union organizing budgets in the United 
States  certainly total  far  less  than  $1  billion.  Furthermore,  the  evidence 
surveyed in the previous section suggests that most wage differentials do not 
arise from organizing activity. 
A  different  line of  argument  against  policies  directed  at  subsidizing  the 
primary  sector  stresses  their  antiegalitarian  consequences. The essence of 
such policies is, after all, subsidizing  workers who are receiving  relatively 
high wages. The argument  is more subtle,  however,  than it at first appears. 
Subsidies to the primary sector enlarge it, thereby raising the probability of 
secondary-sector workers being able to move into the primary sector. Bulow 
and Summers (1986) demonstrate that small subsidies to the primary  sector 
are Pareto improvements relative to laissez faire in the special case where all 
workers are homogeneous,  movements between sectors can be characterized 
by  a Markov  process, and  efficiency  wage considerations  lead to  constant 
lifetime  utility  differences  between  workers  in  the  two  sectors.  More 
generally,  efficiency-enhancing  subsidies  will  not  produce  Pareto improve- 
ments, particularly  if there are some secondary-sector  workers who have no 
chance of  getting primary-sector jobs because of their lack of  skill. It is of 
course possible to argue that optimal subsidies should be given to improve the 
allocation of output, and then income redistribution measures should be used 
to  offset any perverse distributional consequences.*' 
On balance, the arguments in this section suggest that there is a legitimate 
economic argument in support of policies directed at encouraging production 
in high-wage sectors of the economy. Even though such measures are likely 
to  increase  wage  differentials,  they  nevertheless  may  increase  economic 
welfare. Especially in nonunion contexts, it appears unlikely that rent-seeking 
losses  will  outweigh  the  gains  achievable  through  increasing  high-wage 
employment. 
3.3  Wage Differentials and American Trade Policies 
The  belief  that  international  competition  is  profoundly  changing  the 
economic landscape and leading to the deindustrialization of America is often 
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that  the  United  States  is  losing  its  manufacturing  base  to  international 
competitors  is  often  put  forward  as  a justification  for policies  directed  at 
limiting imports or spurring exports. In George Meany’s picturesque phrase, 
“You  cannot  have  a  healthy  economy  based  on  everyone doing everyone 
else’s laundry.” 
The claim that  the  United  States might  lose  its ability to compete in  all 
industries  rests  on  confusion.  As  long  as  foreigners  are  unwilling  to 
accumulate claims on  American  assets  indefinitely,  the  United  States must 
ultimately run a surplus. The interesting question for structural trade policy is 
therefore whether trade balance with a high level of  both exports and imports 
or with a low level of both exports and imports is preferable. 
To shed light on this issue, tables 3.4 and 3.5 present information on the 
characteristics of American manufacturing industries, distinguishing between 
“import”  and “export”  industries. We focus only on manufacturing because 
of  data  limitations  regarding  other  sectors  and  because  manufacturing 
accounts for the lion’s share (about two-thirds) of American trade.’2  The data 
refer to three-digit census industries. The number of  import or export workers 
in each industry is estimated as the product of the industry’s total number of 
employees and the fraction of total industry shipments represented by imports 
or exports. 
Table 3.4 lists the  manufacturing  industries  with  the highest  import and 
export shares. Most of  the export industries rely heavily on high technology, 
aircraft being a prominent example. The import industries are more mixed, 
ranging from footwear to office machines to motor vehicles.  Particularly  in 
the case of export industries,  it is striking that durable and capital goods play 
an important role in merchandise trade. 
lntraindustry  trade  is  very  important even  at  the  three-digit  level;  the 
correlation between import and export shares was 0.06 in 1983. To  highlight 
the differences between import and export workers, the first three columns of 
table 3.5 compare the average characteristics of  the most import- and the most 
export-intensive  industries with those of  the entire manufacturing  sector. 
A clear pattern emerges from the table. Relative to the entire manufacturing 
sector,  export  industries  look  much  more  like  the  primary-sector  firms 
described by  Doeringer and Piore (1971), while import industries look much 
more like secondary-sector firms. Wages in export-intensive industries are 12 
percent  above  average  after  adjusting  for skill differences, while  wages  in 
import-intensive  industries  are  16 percent  below  average.  Roughly  similar 
differentials are observed for both union and nonunion workers. The widely 
cited examples of  automobiles  and  steel, whcrc  very  high-wage  industries 
face  substantial  import  penetration  and  are  almost  completely  unable  to 
export, appear  to  be  atypical. The general  pattern  is that  export-intensive 
industries are the ones with substantial wage premia. 
Reflecting  patterns of  American  comparative advantage, export-intensive 
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Table 3.4  High Import Penetration and Export Supply Ratio Three-Digit 
Census Industries in U.S. Manufacturing, 1983 
Industries Employing Top  10% of  Workers 
by  Import Penetration Ratio" 
Log Wage  Employment 
CIC  Industry  M/(M + S)  X/S  Premiumb  (~,ooos) 

















Watches, clocks, and watchcases 
Footwear, except rubber 
Leather products 
Jewelry and miscellaneous 
manufacturing 
Pottery 
Office and accounting machines 
Toys, amusements, and sporting 
Apparel and accessories 
Motor vehicles 
goods 
Aircraft and aircraft parts 
Construction machinery 
Electronic computing equipment 























~  ,242 
-  .I74 
-  .I66 
-  ,120 
-.I42 
,069 
-  ,095 











Industries Employing Top 10% of Workers 
by  Export Supply Ratio' 
XIS 
Log Wage 











.05  1  .153 
.059  . I10 
.I15  .083 
,053  .227 
.I11  .020 
,070  ,194 
.055  .035 









Source:  NBER trade-immigration-labor  market data set (available from the labor studies group 
of the National Bureau of  Economic Research,  Cambridge, Mass.); and Dickens-Katz (1987a) 
industry data set. 
"The employment weights used in calculations for the top 10 percent import workers are actual 
employment for the top eight industries and 67,200 for motor vehicles. 
bLog wage premiums are calculated from separate regressions on union and nonunion samples 
from  the  full  year  1983  CPS.  The  log  wage  premium  for  an  industry  equals 
{[(UD + 0.192) . UCOV] + NUD .  (1 - UCOV)}, where UD is the estimated industry wage 
premium for union workers, NUD is the premium for nonunion workers, UCOV is the fraction 
of  workers in  the  industry  covered  by  union  agreements,  and 0.192 is  the estimated  union- 
nonunion wage differential for the full-year  1983 CPS from Katz (1986). 
'The  employment weights used in calculations for the top  10 percent export workers are actual 
employment for the top seven industries and  185,800 for industrial chemicals. 108  Lawrence F.  KatzILawrence H. Summers 
Table 3.5  Characteristics of Typical Import and Export Workers in U.S. 
Manufacturing Industries, 1983 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Typical  Typical  Typical 
Manufacturing  Top 10%  Top 10%  Import  Export 
Worker  Imports  Exports  Worker  Worker 
Average hourly wage for 
production workers 
Log wage premium for all 
workers 
Log wage premium for 
nonunion workers 






Research and development 
expenditures as a 
percentage of sales 
Percentage production 
workers 
Average years of  schooling 
Value added per worker 
(thousands of dollars) 
M/(M + S) (in percentages) 
X/S (in percentages) 
8.88 
(1.93) 
.  00 
(.115) 
.  00 
(.  10) 
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~.  135 


























-  ,022 
-  ,015 


























Nore:  Columns  1, 2, and  3  are  three-digit  census industry  averages  weighted  by  industry 
employment. Import and export rankings are based on 1983 trade data. Columns 2 and 3 present 
average characteristics  of  the  top  10  percent  of  workers  by  industry  M/(M + S) and  XIS 
respectively. Column 4 presents three-digit census industries weighted by  industry employment 
times MIS. Column 5  presents three-digit census industries weighted by  industry employment 
times X/S. The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
Sources: Dickens-Katz 1983 industry data set described in Dickens and Katz (1987a); and NBER 
trade-immigration-labor  market industry data set. 
research  and development than import-intensive industries.  Export-intensive 
industries devote 8.7 percent of sales to research and development, compared 
to  1.1  percent  for  import-intensive  industries.  The  average  worker  in 
export-intensive  industry has fourteen years of schooling, compared with  12 
years for the  average worker  in  import-intensive  industry. Import-intensive 
industries also disproportionately  employ women, blacks, and  immigrants, 109  Interindustry Wage Differentials 
whereas  export industries  employ  these  workers  to  less  than  the  average 
extent. 
The comparisons in columns 4 and 5 of the characteristics of the industries 
employing typical export and import workers suggest all the same qualitative 
conclusions as the more extreme comparisons of export- and import-intensive 
industries. Industry differences are attenuated because, in many cases, export- 
and  import-intensive  industries  coincide as  a  result  of  the  importance of 
intraindustry  trade.  Nonetheless,  the  wage differential  between  the  typical 
worker in import- and export-intensive industry is about 8 percent. 
These results suggest that, for the United  States, policies that succeed  in 
promoting trade and increasing the volume of both exports and imports will 
tend  to  raise  welfare  by  moving  workers  from  lower-  to  higher-wage 
industries. The gains are potentially significant.  For example, the estimates 
here suggest that eliminating a manufacturing trade deficit of $150 billion by 
raising exports rather than by reducing imports would increase labor rents by 
at least $12 billion.  If  export-intensive industries were expanded relative to 
import-intensive  industries,  the gains could be up to three times as great. 
3.3.1  International Comparisons 
We  have already documented that the wage structure is very similar in all 
countries. It follows that there is no way in which all countries can dispro- 
portionately export goods produced with high-wage labor. A reasonable con- 
jecture is that one concomitant of  increased economic development is increased 
comparative advantage in the production of primary-sector goods. To examine 
this possibility, table 3.6  presents evidence on the American wage premium of 
import- and export-intensive industries for a number of  countries along with 
information  on the American wage premium associated  with the industries 
employing typical export and import workers. 
The  data  provide  initial  support  for  our  conjecture  about  patterns  of 
economic development. Korea imports goods produced by high-wage indus- 
tries and exports goods produced by low-wage industries. This is not simply 
a consequence of their abundance of  low-skilled labor. The wage premia used 
in these comparisons are estimated controlling for measured labor quality, and 
the evidence  cited  in section 3.1 above suggests that they do not primarily 
reflect unobserved aspects of skill. Most of  the developed countries appear to 
export  relatively  high-wage  premium  goods  while  importing  relatively 
low-wage  goods.  It  is  interesting  that  the  difference in  wage  premiums 
between  high-  and  low-net-export industries  is particularly  pronounced  in 
Germany and Japan. 
The observation  that  specialization  in  high-wage industries  is correlated 
with  per-capita  income  might  be  taken  as  evidence  in  favor  of  policies 
encouraging  the  growth  of  these  industries.  Such  an  inference  would  be 
premature,  however.  It  seems plausible that improved  technology,  manage- 
ment, or worker skills would  lead countries to shift toward capital intensive 
industries  requiring  investment  in  job-specific  human  capital  and  highly 110  Lawrence F.  Katz/Lawrence H. Summers 
Table 3.6  U.S. Log Wage Prernia of Typical Import and Export Workers in 
Manufacturing in Nine Countries, 1983 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Typic  a  1  Typical  Typical  Top 10%  Bottom 10% 
Manufacturing  Import  Export  Net Export  Net Export 




















-  ,000 
,037 
,021 
-  .012 
,020  - 
,001 
,013 










,132  .034 
,013  ,055 
,110  .020 
,145  -  ,106 
,134  -.I13 
,216  ,077 
,053  -  ,045 
,082  -  .I28 
.05 1  -  ,170 
~~  ~ 
Nore:  This table utilizes data from eighteen ISIC manufacturing industries: 321, 322, 323, 324, 
331, 332, 341, 342, 351, 355, 361, 362, 371, 372, 381, 382, 383, 384. 
Sources: Trade flow data on an ISIC basis were provided by Robert Stem of  the University of 
Michigan. The U.S. industry log wage premium variable aggregates using employment weights 
the variable  described  in  n. b  below  of  table  4  from  three-digit  census  industries to  ISIC 
industries. Employment data are from Industrial Statistics Yearbook, 1984, vol.  1 (New York: 
United  Nations, Department  of  International  Economic and Social Affairs,  Statistical Office, 
1986). 
“Three-digit ISIC U.S.  industry log wage premia weighted by  each country’s industry employ- 
ment. 
’Three-digit  ISIC  U.S.  industry  log  wage  premia  weighted  by  each  country’s  industry 
employment times MIS. 
‘Three-digit  ISIC U.S. industry log wage premia weighted by  each country’s industry employ- 
ment times XIS. 
motivated  workers. Moving  workers  from low- to  high-wage  industries  is 
likely to lead to increases in static allocative efficiency. Whether it would lead 
to increases in rates of growth is more problematic. 
3.3.2  Trends in American Trade 
Discussions  of  American  competitiveness  have  differed  on  whether  the 
changing trade patterns of recent years are simply the consequence of aberrant 
exchange rate  movements brought  about  by  macroeconomic  policies  and 
speculative forces or are instead the result of long-term structural deteriora- 
tion. A central  issue in  the deindustrialization  debate is whether the United 
States has  suffered  particularly  severe  competitive  losses  in  “good  indus- 
tries,”  variously  defined  as  those  that  emphasize technology  or have  high 
value added per worker.  The analysis in the preceding  section suggests that 
examining the relative performance of  high- and low-wage industries proba- 
bly provides the best way of  getting at this issue. 
Assuming fixed ratios of employment to shipments, table 3.7 indicates how 
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Table 3.7  The Direct Effect of International Trade on Employment by  Wage 
Class, U.S. Manufacturing, 1960-84 
Change in Employment (in thousands) Fromb: 
Wage Premium Class”  Imports  Exports  Net Exports 
Overall manufacturing: 
1960-84  -  2,621.3  1,107.1  -  1,514.2 
1980-84  -  1,248.0  -  168.4  1,416.5 
1970-80  -941.5  946.7  5.2 
1960-70  -431.7  328.9  -  102.9 
Lowest quartile: 
1960-84  -  1,021.7  71.8  -  950.0 
1980-84  -  576.2  -  60.7  -  636.9 
1970- 80  -  307.6  113.3  -  194.3 
1960-70  -  138.0  19.2  -  118.8 
1960-84  -457.2  323.0  -  134.1 
1980-84  -217.7  10.1  -207.6 
1970- 80  -  177.5  242.8  65.3 
1960- 70  -61.9  70.1  8.2 
Second quartile: 
Third quartile: 
1960-84  -547.8  271.5  -  276.2 
1980- 84  -  220.5  -70.1  -290.6 
1970- 80  -  229.9  251.5  21.6 
1960-70  97.4  90.1  -7.2 
Highest quartile: 
1960-84  -  594.7  440.8  -  153.9 
1980- 84  -233.7  -47.6  -281.3 
1970- 80  -  226.6  339.  I  112.5 
1960-70  -  134.4  149.4  15.0 
aIndustries were ranked by the industry wage premium variable defined in n. b of  table 3.4 and 
placed into quartiles on the basis of  1983 employment. 
qhe loss  in  employment  from  imports  for  industry  i  from  period  t  to  t’  is  defined  as 
[(M,,’ -  Mi,) . (L/Qi],  where M is imports and (LiQ),  is the ratio of employment to  output in 
industly i in  1984. Imports and output  are  measured  in quantities  with  their nominal values 
deflated by the four-digit SIC industry shipments deflator from the Annual Survey of Manufac- 
tures.  The  gain  in  employment  from  exports is  analogously  defined  with  exports replacing 
imports. The trade flow, employment, and output data are from the NBER  trade-immigration- 
labor market data set. 
industries. Between  1960 and 1980, the number of jobs displaced by imports 
was approximately  equal to the number of jobs created by exports. Particu- 
larly during the  1970s, increased imports led to a reallocation of labor out of 
the lowest-wage jobs in the manufacturing sector. Increased U.S. exports led 
to  increased employment in  high-wage  sectors of the economy.  During  the 
1980s, the fraction of  workers employed in producing tradable goods declined 
as the trade deficit increased. Between  1980 and 1984, the last year for which 
we have data available, the increase in the trade deficit was associated with a 
reduction of 1.4 million workers producing traded manufacturing goods. Over 112  Lawrence F.  Katz/Lawrence H. Summers 
600,000, or 43 percent, of these workers worked in the quartile of industries 
that paid  the  lowest wages.  This reflects  the  substantial  increase  in  import 
penetration  in industries such as apparel during the early 1980s. 
These results conflict dramatically with popular stereotypes suggesting that 
the  United  States  is  being  forced  away  from cutting-edge  industries.  We 
suspect that the popular misconception results from the fact that traded goods 
industries as a whole pay  higher  wages than the rest  of  the economy.  In  a 
period when the trade deficit rises, good jobs are lost. But these jobs are likely 
to come back when the trade deficit returns to balance.23  There appears to be 
little evidence through 1984 of  relative deterioration in the high-wage portion 
of  the American traded goods sector. 
These  patterns  should  not  be  surprising.  Postulate  that  “cutting-edge 
industries”  pay  wage  premia.  Following  the  discussion  of  Krugman  and 
Baldwin  (1987), assume that other nations are catching  up with the United 
States. They then  make  incursions  into the least progressive  sectors of  our 
economy, causing U.S. workers to move toward high-wage  industries. 
3.4  Conclusions 
The analysis in the preceding  sections suggests that  imperfections  in the 
labor  market  may  have  at  least  as  much  significance  as  imperfections  in 
product  markets for trade policies.  Labor market rents earned by workers  in 
high-wage industries are very large relative to plausible estimates of monop- 
oly profits. Unlike the case of  product market imperfections, where optimal 
policies  are  not  robust  to  small  changes  in  assumptions  about  corporate 
strategies, the theoretical case for policies that promote high-wage  premium 
industries  is reasonably  robust.  Given  that  export industries  in  the  United 
States have considerably higher wages than import-competing industries even 
after controlling  for observed  worker  skill  measures, our theoretical  argu- 
ments suggest that export-promoting policies are much more likely to promote 
economic welfare than import-competing policies. 
There are of  course a number of other considerations that must be weighed 
before any policy judgments are made. First, following much of the literature, 
we  have  abstracted  from  the  possibility  that  some  industries  generate 
technological externalities.  If  such externalities are generated and are limited 
by  national  borders,  there  is  a  strong  case for encouraging  the  growth  of 
externality-generating  industries.  Second, if wages are very  sensitive to the 
rents  earned  by  firms,  it  is  possible  that  product  market  effects are  more 
important than we have suggested but show up as labor market rents.24  Third, 
we  have  ignored  input-output  considerations  in  our  discussion,  implicitly 
assuming  that  all  output  is  produced  in  the  industry  making  a  given 
shipment.25  Fourth, we have ignored political considerations  that might lead 
activist policymakers to take steps that reduce rather than increase efficiency 
once the decision to undertake industrial policy  was made. 113  Interindustry Wage Differentials 
Despite  these  limitations,  we  believe  that  our  results  strengthen  the 
economic case against  import-protecting policies  and for export-promoting 
policies.  In  future  research,  it  would  be  useful  to  employ  a  general 
equilibrium model such as those developed by Shoven and his collaborators 
to explore more  precisely  the effect of  various policies  in the presence of 
noncompetitive  wage differentials. Of particular interest would be a reeval- 
uation of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which appears to have heavily burdened 
the high-wage durable goods manufacturing sector of  the economy. 
Notes 
1.  An analysis of labor rents and trade policies paralleling ours in many respects is 
presented in Dickens and Lang (1988). Our analysis differs in contrasting the relative 
importance  of  labor  market  and  product  market  imperfections,  focusing  on  the 
manufacturing sector, and making international comparisons of wages and trade flows. 
A more extensive treatment of the topics covered in this paper is available in Katz and 
Summers (1989). 
2. A prominent exception to this criticism is Krugman (1984), who emphasizes the 
potential importance of wage differentials caused by unions. 
3.  The presumption that labor rents are much greater than rents received by firms 
does not necessarily mean that product market imperfections are a minor source of 
rents. A large fraction of the rents earned by workers may arise from the ability of both 
union and nonunion labor to share in  product market rents.  For example, Salinger 
(1984) presents evidence indicating that union labor captures most of the monopoly 
rents in heavily unionized industries. 
4. This conclusion is hardly new. It was noted by Adam Smith and highlighted by 
Sumner Slichter (1950), and it has been emphasized by  institutionally oriented labor 
economists for many years. 
5.  Although the CPS is partially  a panel data  set, only  individuals in outgoing 
rotation groups are asked about earnings. Further, people exit the sample only once a 
year. Thus, all observations reflect unique individuals. 
6. We  eliminated  employees  who  reported  earning  less than  $1.00 an  hour  or 
greater than $250 an hour. 
7.  The industry labor cost and wage data are reported in the National Income and 
Product  Accounts  (NIPAs) and  were  previously  utilized  in  Krueger and  Summers 
(1988). 
8.  Since the NIPA and CPS industry classification schemes do not match exactly, 
caution should be taken in comparing the results in col.  3. 
9. The nonunion sample consists of workers not covered by  collective bargaining 
agreements. The results are almost identical when the union membership is used as the 
criterion for excluding a worker from the nonunion sample. 
10.  The estimates are taken from table 2 of Krueger and Summers (1988). 
11.  In contrast, Murphy and Welch (1988) document that the earnings of “skilled” 
(college-educated) workers rose dramatically relative to those of less-educated workers 
from 1979 to 1985. They provide some suggestive evidence that increased net imports 
in  manufacturing  may  have  played  an  important  role  in  the  widening  of  skill 
differentials. 114  Lawrence F.  KatzlLawrence H. Summers 
12. For contrasting findings using matched March CPS data, see Murphy and Topel 
(1987). Gibbons and Katz (1987) discuss in detail potential reasons for differences in 
findings in alternative longitudinal data sets. 
13. At the cost of some complexity, the special assumption that capital is not used 
in producing secondary-sector output could be relaxed. It does capture the stylized fact 
noted in the previous section that high-wage sectors tend to be capital intensive. 
14.  For an explicit derivation of a d(Lp)  schedule from an efficiency wage model, 
see Bulow and Summers (1986). 
15.  The optimal subsidy will be set at d(Lp‘),  where Lp’ is the level of primary- 
sectory employment at which p(Yp)F(KP,Lp)  = 
16. We  focus on the “small open-economy ,a:,’.’  to highlight the implications of 
wage differentials for trade policy. In  the case of  open economies large enough to 
affect  the  prices  at  which  they  buy  and  sell,  there  are  traditional  optimal  tariff 
considerations as well. These suggest the desirability of taxing rather than subsidizing 
exports  when  expanding  exports  can  lead  to  at  least  a  moderate  terms-of-trade 
deterioration.  In this case, our analysis of  employment  subsidies is  correct  if  it is 
assumed  that  optimal  tariffs  (taxes)  based  on  these  traditional  considerations  are 
already in place. 
17. This point has also been made by  Dickens and Lang (1988). 
18. This point is well known from the development literature on project evaluation 
(e.g., Sah and Stiglitz 1985). 
19.  Since each new job created in the primary sector removes  1/(1 - u)  workers 
from secondary employment, and since wo/(l  ~  u)  wp,  the social opportunity cost of 
labor for an additional job in the primary sector equals the marginal product of labor 
in the primary sector. 
20.  For a more detailed discussion of wait unemployment and the measurement of 
thc social opportunity cost of labor, see Sah and Stiglitz (1985) and the references cited 
therein. 
21.  The issue is  a complex because policies that tax  high-wage workers for the 
benefit of  low-wage  workers  will,  at  least  in  some  efficiency wage  models,  have 
perverse  effects  on  the  composition  of  output  by  reducing  the  relative  utility  of 
primary-sector workers. Thus, income redistribution policies may undo the allocative 
effects of  subsidies to sectors that pay  wage premia. 
22.  For consideration of  the  relation between  U.S. trade and  wages outside the 
manufacturing sector, see Dickens and Lang (1988). 
23.  On the other hand, for an argument that transitory exchange rate shocks may 
permanently affect an economy’s ability to compete in  some industries, see Baldwin 
and Krugman (1986). 
24.  Rent-sharing  considerations  are  examined  in  detail  in  Katz  and  Summers 
(1  989). 
25.  Dickens and Lang (1988) find  that taking into account input-output relations 
does  not  greatly  affect  one’s  conclusions  concerning  the  cross-sectional  relations 
among wage premiums and trade flows in the United States. 
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Comment  Kenneth A. Froot 
Lawrence F. Katz and Lawrence H. Summers have written a very nice paper. 
Its principle  point  is  to  remind  “new  wave”  trade  economists that  factor 
market distortions  are likely to be  an important consideration  in designing 
commercial  policy.  Of  course,  factor  market  distortions already  occupy  a 
prominent  place  in the traditional  trade literature. Stephen Magee’s (1969) 
famous survey cites over one hundred papers and books going back to Cairnes 
(1874), Ohlin (1933), and Viner  (1964). It  is probably  fair to say that our 
current  understanding  about  the  first-  to  the  nth  best  treatment  of  wage 
distortions in the absence of product market distortions has not changed much 
since Bhagwati (1971). 
Katz and Summers in a sense rejuvenate this older literature.  They argue 
that, in fact, product  market distortions, which  are the focus of  much new 
wave trade theory,  are likely to  be  small in comparison with  labor  market 
distortions. They provide  an impressive  array of  evidence from the United 
States and a number of  other countries that (I) intersectoral wage differentials 
are large, with a standard deviation of  13- 18 percent; (2)  the differentials are 
highly persistent over time and very similar across countries; and (3) export 
industries tend to have higher wages than import industries.  The paper then 
argues that these differentials do in fact constitute distortions or rents. In other 
words, intersectoral  wage  differentials  cannot be  explained  by  unobserved 
differences  in  the  quality  of  workers  or of jobs.  Katz  and  Summers also 
review  briefly  the  efficiency  wage  explanation  for why  such  differentials 
persist. 
Whether these differentials are noncompetitive  in nature is the subject of 
debate in labor economics and could not possibly be resolved here. I want to 
focus instead  on  the paper’s arguments  for intervention,  taking  for granted 
that the differentials do in fact represent distortions and assuming, as Katz and 
Summers do, that  there  are no product  market  distortions. In  short, under 
these  circumstances  the paper  suggests that  intersectoral  wage  differentials 
may justify  export-promoting  policies to improve U.S. welfare. 
To  study  the  effects of  export  promotion,  Katz  and  Summers build  a 
two-sector economy in  which  labor  in  the  “primary”  sector earns a wage 
higher than the wage in the numeraire sector. The wage premium is a rent. In 
equilibrium, when the wage is set to the marginal product of labor, the output 
of  the  primary  good  is  too low.  The first-best  allocation  of  labor  can  be 
achieved  by  a  subsidy  to employment in  the  primary  sector.  In  a  closed 
economy, the price  of the primary good falls as output expands, yielding a 
gain in consumer surplus. 
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Katz and Summers turn to consider this small economy once it is opened 
internationally. The effect of  trade in their model is to fix the price of  the 
primary good. I wonder whether the fixed-price assumption is appropriate. 
First, most of  the discussion in the paper centers on wage differentials and 
trade policy in the United States, where the small-country assumption clearly 
does not hold. Second, manufactured goods, which form the bulk of traded 
goods in the United States, are often highly differentiated. Even the small 
country that produces these goods in a perfectly competitive export sector will 
face declining international demand. 
It is easy to show that the case for export promotion relies heavily on the 
fixed-price assumption. As  I show below,  a relatively mild  terms-of-trade 
deterioration due to an export expansion program is likely to be enough to 
reverse the paper's policy conclusions. Ignoring these effects may lead to an 
overly optimistic view of the scope for intervention. At one point, Katz and 
Summers suggest that home subsidies that are matched by foreign subsidies 
are likely to raise welfare in both countries. This result is in contrast to the 
negative effects on home-country welfare of foreign retaliation in the presence 
of imperfect competition. Katz and Summers's assertion will depend critically 
on the terms-of-trade effects of the subsidies and on whether the home country 
is a net importer or exporter of the primary good. 
TO demonstrate how sensitive the results are to the terms-of-trade effects, 
consider a version of  the Katz and Summers model. To  make the point as 
starkly and simply as possible, I will assume that the country exports all its 
primary-good  output.  The  social  planner  faces  a  noncompetitive  wage 
distortion and must decide whether to subsidize or tax output in the primary 
sector. Using Katz and Summers's notation, the planner maximizes the value 
of total output less wage costs: 
max Y"  + PYP  - w,,L -  PYP. 
S 
where L  = L*  + L"  is the country's  total labor force,  P  is  the price of 
primary output paid by  foreigners, the price of numeraire output is one, and 
s is the subsidy rate. Note that the assumption that primary output is entirely 
exported makes a production subsidy equal to an export subsidy. Note also 
that the social planner evaluates the cost of labor at its opportunity cost-the 
cost of labor in the numeraire sector, wo.  To keep things simple, assume that 
labor is the only input into production of the primary good, Yp  = f(Lp).  (This 
implies that a production subsidy is also equivalent to a subsidy to employ- 
ment.) Using the rest of the model as specified in Katz and Summers, we have 
the standard first-order condition: 
Pf,(ll@  +  1) - w = 0, 
where  9 is  the  price  elasticity  of  foreign  primary  product  demand.' 
Primary-product producers are on their labor demand curve, given the level of 
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Combining equations (1) and (2) yields the optimal export subsidy: 
where  the  asterisk  indicates  the  variable  is  evaluated  at  s,  the  optimal 
subsidy. Katz and Summers find that a reasonable estimate ford  is about 0.25. 
This implies that, if the price elasticity of exports is five, the optimal subsidy 
is  exactly  zero.  Most  reasonable  estimates  of  export-price  elasticities  are 
much less than five. In this case, the optimal policy is an export tax. Katz and 
Summers  suggest  that,  by  eliminating  the  $150  billion  U.S.  trade  deficit 
entirely  through  export  expansion,  U.S.  welfare  would  increase  by  $12 
billion.* If this enormous 60 percent expansion of U.S. exports resulted in an 
8 percent decline in export prices-an  elasticity of roughly eight-the  welfare 
gain would  be completely negated.  If  the price elasticity is lower, as it no 
doubt is in industries such as aircraft, this method of reducing the trade deficit 
would reduce welfare, even in the presence of wage distortions. 
Notice  that  this  standard  result  ignores  imperfect  competition  in  the 
primary-product market,  which  is what justifies export promotion  in newer 
trade models. I do not think that export sectors are perfectly competitive and 
that the right policy for the United States would be a tax on exports. Rather, 
my point is that, even in the presence of wage distortions, most arguments for 
export  promotion  will  ultimately  rely  on some  product  market  distortion. 
Indeed,  it  is quite  likely  that  these  factor  and  product  market  distortions 
interact  in  practice.  For  example, unions  might  bid  wages  up in  order to 
absorb profits generated by  imperfect competition in the product market.  A 
more sophisticated theory might even have organized labor in an oligopolistic 
industry bid up wages not only to absorb current profits but also to restrict 
output.  By  forcing  firms to  up  their  labor  demand  curves,  unions  could 
reproduce the monopolistic outcome while absorbing all the profits.  In such 
cases, the right policies will be those that undo the underlying product market 
imperfections. Causality could also run in the opposite direction. Competing 
firms might find product market collusion more credible if they face similar 
factor market distortions. Then the right policies will target the labor market 
distortions.  The Katz  and  Summers paper provides  an  important  stepping 
stone to this kind of topic. 
Notes 
1. I assume that the cross-price elasticity is zero. 
2.  This  is  150 x  0.8 =  12, where 0.8 is the  difference  in  wages between  the 
average export worker and the average import worker. 120  Lawrence F.  KatdLawrence H. Summers 
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Comment  Raquel Fernandez 
The main  contribution  of  this  paper  is to  bring  to the  attention  of  trade 
theorists a great deal of what is known about interindustry wage differentials 
and a discussion of some of  the possible reasons for its causes. The authors 
quite convincingly show that the wage differential is still large when observed 
characteristics  are  controlled  for and  that  job attributes  on  their  own  are 
unlikely to explain the wage differential. Their arguments against unmeasured 
labor quality are somewhat weaker, but their most convincing counterargu- 
ment is the fact that wages are correlated across occupations in an industry and 
that there is no good reason to expect an industry that needs especially good 
engineers  also to need  especially  good  secretaries.  Most of  the alternative 
efficiency wage (EW) hypotheses, however, are also unable to account for the 
correlation of wages across occupations in an industry. As Katz and Summers 
(K&S) admit, in order to explain this fact it is necessary to marry some sort 
of  Akerlof/egalitarianism type of story to an EW story. But it is also possible 
to combine an equity story to either unobserved job attributes or labor quality, 
which  would  then  allow  either  alternative  hypothesis  to  command  more 
explanatory power than before. 
Efficiency Implications of Wage Subsidies 
Acknowledging  the  diversity  of  reasons  that  may  underlie  interindustry 
wage differentials,  K&S nonetheless  state that the implications  of noncom- 
petitive wage differentials among nonunion workers for trade policies do not 
depend  on their  precise  cause. Is  this  really  true? Consider the  following 
scenario. Suppose that there are two industries and two occupations: managers 
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and engineers.  For  simplicity,  assume that the marginal product of labor in 
each occupation is independent of  the number of workers employed  in the 
other  occupation.  Furthermore, suppose  that  engineers  in  industry  1 earn 
higher wages than engineers in industry 2 (i.e., w2  = w,  + a)  because work 
conditions for engineers  in industry  1 are more unattractive.  Let us  argue, 
moreover, that managers in industry 1 also earn higher wages than managers 
in industry 2 for sociological/social equity types of reasons. Concretely, let us 
assume that each percentage increase in the wage of engineers must be met by 
an  equal percentage increase in the wage of managers.  What would  be the 
effect if, following K&S’s prescription, we were to subsidize all employment 
in industry  l?  The effect of a wage subsidy s is shown in figure 3C. 1. The 
employment of  engineers in industry  1, previously socially efficient, would 
increase, creating an allocative distortion  in the market for engineers.  The 
wage  of  engineers  also  increases  (but by  less than  the  full amount  of  the 
subsidy).  More  surprisingly,  however,  while  the  subsidy  would  tend  to 
increase the employment of managers in industry 1,  thus increasing efficiency 
(since the value of the marginal product of managers is greater in industry l), 
the increased wage of engineers sets up a countervailing force since the wage 
of  managers  must  increase  by  at  least  the  same percentage.  If  managers’ 
wages had originally been greater than those of engineers, then it is possible, 
as shown in figure 3C.  1, that the economy could end up with less managers 
employed in industry  1 than there were prior to the subsidy, thus increasing 
inefficiency  in  both  labor  markets.  Note  that  this  effect  is  not  due to  the 
assumption of the way that the market for engineers functions. Suppose that 
the higher wages for engineers in industry 1 were really a result of some EW 
story.  A  subsidy  would  now  create  an  improvement  in  the  allocation  of 
engineers, but it is still possible that the employment of managers in industry 
1 could fall and that overall efficiency would worsen by a sufficient degree. 
There are other reasons why a labor subsidy might be counterproductive. 
Schumpeterian considerations,  such as the hypothesis  that the  existence  of 
rents  causes  firms  to  be  less  innovative  since  there  is  less  competitive 
pressure, imply that subsidizing high-wage firms may also have unfavorable 
effects on the effort that firms expend on research and development activities. 
Indeed, the positive empirical correlation between rents and high wages may 
simply imply that the distortion is occurring in the product market and then 
being passed on to the labor market through some bargaining mechanism. In 
this case, a first-best policy would probably imply some intervention on the 
product  rather  than  on  the  labor  market  side. On the  whole,  while  many 
scenarios  do have  a high  wage  being  indicative  of  a  higher  value  of  the 
marginal product of  labor and result in a labor subsidy improving allocative 
efficiency, the fact that the implications of bargaining in the workplace and of 
the strategic  interactions of the product market with the labor market  have 
only  recently  received  attention leads  me to be rather  more wary  than the 
authors about the efficiency implications of a labor subsidy. 122  Lawrence F.  Katz/Lawrence H. Summers 
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Welfare Consequences 
The welfare consequences of  labor subsidies, on the other hand, have the 
property  in almost every  plausible  scenario of  not  being  Pareto improving 
and, moreover,  worsening  the distribution  of  income.  In  the  example dis- 
cussed  by  K&S, it is  necessary  to assume that  workers  are homogeneous 
and  that  the  movement  of  workers  between  sectors is  characterized  by  a 
Markovian process  in order that  a labor subsidy be Pareto improving. The 
second assumption is especially objectionable, and any relaxation of it results 
in a labor subsidy not being Pareto improving. Nor can one wave the usual 
magic wand and appeal to some income distributional mechanism to take care 123  Interindustry Wage  Differentials 
of this redistributive aspect.  Indeed, one of the main benefits of a model in 
which labor market distortions are endogenous is that it allows one to examine 
the feasibility of different redistributive measures. Whereas the study of labor 
market interactions with trade often assumes that the labor market distortion 
is exogenous  (e.g., rigid exogenous wage differentials) and thus  is able to 
claim  that  a  system  of  lump-sum  taxes  and  subsidies  will  take  care  of 
compensation problems, the taxation of workers in sector  1  in an EW model 
reduces those workers’  after-tax  income (presumably what they care about) 
and must be counteracted by the firm by an increase in the wage in order to 
leave the after-tax income at its optimal level. Consequently, unless firms are 
generating  a sufficient amount of  rent that may be taxed without creating a 
distortion, the tax to pay for the wage subsidy must fall on sector 2 workers, 
thus serving to worsen the distribution of income. This seems a strong reason 
to recommend against the subsidization of employment in high-wage indus- 
tries. 
Strategic Trade Policy Implications 
Katz and Summers observe that the wage differential between the typical 
worker in import- and export-intensive industries is about 8 percent (in favor 
of the export-sector worker). This suggests to them that, for the United States, 
policies that succeed in promoting trade and increases in the volume of export 
and imports will tend to raise welfare by moving workers from the lower- to 
the higher-wage industries. Once again, the aforementioned caveats regarding 
welfare apply.  Moreover, Dickens and Lang (1988), who include the agri- 
cultural and  service  sector in  their  study,  conclude  that  the  average  wage 
surplus in  the  export sector relative to the  import sector  is approximately 
equal.  Furthermore,  arguing  in  favor  of  export  subsidies  is  potentially 
dangerous. Retaliation in the form of a tariff that, say, leaves the total quantity 
of the good imported by the foreign country at the same level it was at prior 
to  the  subsidy  simply  allows  the  foreign  country  to  capture  the  revenue 
associated with the tariff  without  producing  any compensatory  allocational 
effects at home. Labor subsidies, while not only being first best, also have less 
of a chance of being retaliated against since GATT rules may allow subsidies 
whose primary purpose is not seen as expanding exports. 
The Deindustrialization Debate 
Katz  and  Summers attempt to debunk the idea that  the United  States  is 
losing its cutting-edge, high-wage industries. Although they note that, during 
the period  1980-84,  the increase in the trade deficit was associated with a 
reduction of 1.4 million workers producing traded manufacturing goods, they 
do not find this to be a cause for concern since these jobs will come back when 
the trade deficit returns to balance. Their faith on this eventuality rests on the 
transversality  condition: the United States cannot run a trade deficit forever. 
Accepting this, nonetheless, there is no a priori reason to believe that, by the 
time the United States eventually does run a trade surplus, the composition of 124  Lawrence F.  KatziLawrence H. Summers 
exports will still have a preponderance of  high-wage occupations. That is, in 
order to be able to discuss the legitimacy of the deindustrialization arguments 
sensibly,  one must  be  able to say  something  about  what  our comparative 
advantage  will  be  in  the  future.  Standard  neoclassical  economic  theory, 
however,  has  very  little  to  tell  us  about  the  dynamic  determinants  of  a 
country’s comparative advantage. It may very well be that the latter depends 
very heavily on the policies that our and foreign governments  follow today. 
Hence, we may interpret the deindustrialization  debate as telling  US that we 
must worry about the dynamic consequences of  the trade deficit. 
General Considerations 
The factors that result in efficiency wages may also produce other important 
distortions. The hiring of other productive factors will also be distorted. More 
important, it may be that if, as in some EW stories, firms fear the power of 
workers to disrupt the workplace (say, by destroying costly capital equipment) 
those firms are led to expend less resources than what is socially optimal in 
technological  innovation  or  perhaps  to  place  too  great  an  emphasis  on 
labor-saving  technology.  Hence,  another  avenue that  the authors  may  find 
interesting to explore is whether  wage  differentials  are  more  significant in 
some countries  than  in others and thus whether  social institutions,  worker- 
management  schemes, profit-sharing mechanisms, and so on are capable of 
playing  a role that firms in the United States may also profitably use to deal 
with the reasons that efficiency wages arise. 
To  conclude, I found K&S’s reminder to trade theorists of the significance 
of labor  market  rents  both  timely  and important,  as  demonstrated  by  the 
ability  of  labor rents  to overturn  the  welfare  implications  of  the  Airbus 
subsidy  and  as  they  enable  us  to  make  some  economic  sense  of  the 
significance of the deindustrialization  debate. 
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